The Mobile World Congress (MWC) recently held in Barcelona has once again demonstrated the growing influence of China in the global technology arena. Beyond the traditional focus on connectivity, the event highlighted areas such as artificial intelligence, robotics, quantum technologies and new network architectures. The influence of large Chinese companies among the most visible exhibitors was also significant, with a notable presence in infrastructure, devices, services and business solutions. This is an example, here in Spain, of the evolution that the “Land of the Rising Sun” is undergoing.
Today, China approved its five-year plan (2026-2030), which is based on the country’s transition to a model in which innovation—rather than construction or bricks and mortar—acts as the engine of growth. At its meeting in Davos last January, the World Economic Forum described this phase as a period of strategic adaptation: greater global volatility, internal changes in the Chinese economy and technological competition that is pushing the country to strengthen its self-sufficiency and industrial robustness.
This roadmap has become even more explicit in the political messages of recent days. The five-year plan and related documents presented at the National People’s Congress position artificial intelligence as cross-cutting infrastructure (AI+), alongside disruptive investments in robotics, quantum computing, biomedicine, 6G and other frontier technologies. Its objective is not only to invent, but also to improve the industrialisation of innovation: to convert scientific advances into productive, exportable capabilities and, where appropriate, also into strategic advantages.
China sees this plan as a decisive step towards modernisation by 2035, but one designed for a more unpredictable world. In practice, this translates into three simultaneous movements: increasing integration between the economy and security; a reinforced emphasis on enabling technologies, such as AI, semiconductors and advanced computing; and a growing priority for the mass adoption of these technologies in industry, public services and consumption.
In other words, Beijing is not just seeking to lead in basic research or increase the number of start-ups. Its approach is much more systemic: to create a complete technological ecosystem that connects universities, large companies, industrial SMEs, public administrations, capital and regulation. China’s competitive advantage would come not only from invention, but from its ability to scale it up quickly.
An objective way to track this evolution is to look at intellectual property. Data from the World Intellectual Property Organization shows a very significant change in scale, with intellectual property playing a key role. According to data from PONS IP, 3.7 million patent applications were filed worldwide in 2024, with much of the growth explained by the increase in applicants residing in China, with 1.8 million applications.
Even more important is the long-term trend: China’s share of total global applications has grown sharply over the last decade, to nearly half of the global total. This does not automatically mean that all patents are of the same quality, but it does confirm that China has built up extraordinary technological density: more innovative companies, more active universities, more formal protection of intangible assets and an institutional machinery geared towards converting knowledge into an economic advantage.
The same logic applies in emerging fields such as generative AI. Recent data indicates that China clearly leads in the volume of inventions related to this generative AI. This fits in with the national strategy: it is not just a question of developing algorithms, but of accumulating intellectual property, applied knowledge and business deployment capacity.
If we focus on the most strategic sectors, China is already the largest market for industrial robots; it also wants to dominate their manufacture and export. According to the International Federation of Robotics, the country accounts for a very high proportion of global installations and has well exceeded two million operational robots in its factories. In addition, according to the recent report on social robotics by PONS IP, the number of robotics patents generated in China now stands at 72%.
This advance has obvious strategic importance. Robotics boosts productivity, helps offset demographic pressure and acts as a platform for the next industrial wave: artificial vision, flexible automation, intelligent logistics and physical AI systems, i.e. artificial intelligence integrated into machines capable of interacting with the physical environment. That is why robotics is not an isolated sector, but a central part of China’s new industrial policy.
AI has become the cross-cutting layer of China’s technological strategy. The priority is no longer just to develop large models, but to deploy AI across the entire economy: manufacturing, healthcare, education, mobility, finance and administration. The idea of AI+ sums up this ambition well. The state wants AI to increase productivity, reduce costs, drive new services and strengthen the international competitiveness of Chinese companies.
References from Foreign Affairs and other think tanks insist on one key point: the debate is no longer whether China will have advanced AI capabilities, but how quickly it will be able to scale them up and turn them into a sustained economic and strategic advantage. This includes both civilian applications and security and defence implications. This is precisely why political, financial and regulatory support for AI is structural in nature, not circumstantial.
Quantum computing and, broadly speaking, quantum technologies, feature prominently on the medium- and long-term agenda. Here, interest is not limited to improving computation: it also includes high-precision sensors and secure communications. Although many applications are still maturing, China believes that this race could redefine future scientific, industrial and national security advantages.
Overall, China’s technological strategy for the coming years is pursuing something more ambitious than leading specific sectors. Its goal is to build an ecosystem so dense in talent, intellectual property, production, data and industrial adoption that the country’s trajectory will be difficult to reverse, even in a more fragmented geopolitical environment.
Patent data shows leadership; robotics data shows industrial penetration; AI appears as the great cross-cutting infrastructure; and quantum computing appears as a long-term commitment to technological sovereignty. Events such as the MWC reinforce this reading: China’s technological strategy is no longer just a political promise, but a combination of state planning, business strength and international deployment capacity.
While the United States is changing global geopolitics, China is seeking this technological leadership and offering itself as an alternative source of stability in the face of global conflicts. What is Europe’s role?
- Europe arrives at this moment with scientific, industrial and regulatory capabilities that are still highly relevant, but with an increasingly visible structural weakness: fragmentation. Compared to the scale of the United States and China’s systemic planning, the European Union too often continues to function as a sum of national markets, rules and priorities. Enrico Letta’s 2024 report on the single market insists precisely that Europe can no longer be content with “having a market”: it needs to turn that market into a true platform for innovation, capital, energy, telecommunications and knowledge. Without this continental dimension, Europe will continue to generate good ideas, but not necessarily great technological champions.
- Mario Draghi’s report, also from 2024, goes a step further and makes an even more forceful diagnosis: Europe risks losing competitiveness in a structural way if it does not accelerate investment, productivity and integration. The gap is not only technological; it is also one of speed, financing, technology transfer from R&D centres and execution capacity.
- While China is turning industrial policy into deployment and the United States is mobilising capital on a large scale, Europe remains trapped between excessive bureaucracy, incomplete capital markets, high energy costs and insufficient strategic coordination. In sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced computing, networks, defence or clean technologies, the problem in Europe is not so much a lack of talent as the difficulty in transforming that talent into industry, scalable intellectual property and business leadership.
Written by: Luis Ignacio Vicente. Strategic Advisor at PONS IP.
