After more than five years of litigation between Mr Wonderful Comunication S.L. (“Mr Wonderful”) and Clave Denia S.A. and Clave Denia Canarias S.A. (“Ale-Hop”), the so-called “Cute War” has finally come to an end following the judgment handed down by the Spanish Supreme Court on 10 September 2026 (ECLI: ES:TS:2026:3682).

Originally, the claimant based its case on the Spanish Unfair Competition Act, seeking an order requiring Ale-Hop to cease and withdraw, at its own expense, any use that could imitate or create confusion with what it considered its distinctive style. That style, often described as the “cute style”, is characterised by pastel colours, illustrations of everyday objects brought to life (typically anthropomorphised or featuring smiling faces), and motivational or witty phrases.

In essence, Mr Wonderful objected to the fact that a direct competitor had also decided to market products designed to inspire and motivate consumers.

From the perspective of intellectual property, industrial property and unfair competition law, however, the case began from a fundamental principle: ideas and concepts cannot be monopolised. For that reason, and correctly so, no copyright claims were brought in relation to the alleged imitation.

Nor was there any trade mark infringement. As a result, Mr Wonderful pursued its action solely through the Spanish Unfair Competition Act, leaving aside other possible industrial property rights.

This brings us to the first key point addressed by the Supreme Court. In its sixth legal ground, the Court reaffirmed that the mere act of imitation does not automatically fall within Article 11.1 of the Unfair Competition Act, which requires the imitated subject matter to be protected by an exclusive right recognised by law.

In this case, a registered industrial design could have served precisely that purpose. Mr Wonderful owns various registered designs, including RCD Nos. 006884482-0001 and 006890125-0001, among many others. The difficulty was that its claim was not pleaded as an industrial design infringement action but solely as an unfair competition claim.

Since those industrial property rights were not relied upon in the proceedings, the Court held that the lower courts had been correct in rejecting any infringement of Article 11.1 and consequently dismissed grounds one to six of the appeal.

With that avenue closed, the dispute ultimately came down to deciding whether, on the basis of the available evidence, Ale-Hop’s conduct amounted to unfair imitation, either because it created a likelihood of association or because it unfairly exploited Mr Wonderful’s reputation in the marketplace.

The Supreme Court had already established the criteria for assessing these issues in earlier case law.

For an act of imitation to be considered unfair, the case law requires the existence of either a likelihood of association or an unfair taking of reputation. To establish this, three elements are generally required.

First, the claimant’s products must possess what is known as competitive distinctiveness, meaning that they display specific characteristics capable of identifying a particular style and leading consumers to associate that style with a particular undertaking or brand.

As the Court explained:

“The imitation of a product or service may generate a likelihood of association in the mind of consumers, even where the forms of presentation differ, including where very different trade marks are used. In other words, the likelihood of association arises from the imitation of the product or service itself, insofar as it possesses competitive distinctiveness, rather than from the use of distinctive signs or methods of presentation. However, the ability of such imitation to generate association may be neutralised where the presentation and branding are so different that any likelihood of association is effectively ruled out.”

Secondly, there must be a genuine likelihood that consumers could believe there is some form of economic or legal connection between the manufacturers or distributors of the respective products.

Thirdly, with regard to the unfair exploitation of reputation, the Court noted that this generally requires a likelihood of association, whereby the imitator benefits from the investment made by another undertaking and avoids the costs that would otherwise have been incurred in developing its own distinctive commercial identity.

Importantly, the Supreme Court accepted that Mr Wonderful’s products did indeed possess competitive distinctiveness. In other words, they contained features capable of making them recognisable in the marketplace and distinguishable from competing products.

Against that background, one of Ale-Hop’s most characteristic features became particularly relevant: its iconic cow.

The Court found that Ale-Hop had long developed its own visual identity, characterised by the presence of a cow at the entrance to each store, large display windows offering a direct view of the interior, the organisation of products into themed collections, and the consistent use of the ALE-HOP brand across its product ranges.

Put simply, the average consumer could have no genuine doubt as to the commercial origin of the products sold in Ale-Hop stores.

The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Ale-Hop had unfairly taken advantage of Mr Wonderful’s efforts. In its view, Mr Wonderful had failed to prove, or even quantify, the costs incurred in developing the features allegedly copied.

In practical terms, if a claimant cannot demonstrate how much investment was made in creating the elements that allegedly differentiate its products from those of competitors, it becomes extremely difficult to establish that a competitor has obtained an unfair economic advantage by imitating them.

The Court further dismissed the allegation that the imitation had been systematic and predatory. On the one hand, Mr Wonderful had failed to identify the total number of products allegedly imitated or the specific period during which the conduct was said to have occurred. On the other hand, there was no evidence that Ale-Hop’s activity had constituted an economic barrier or obstacle capable of excluding Mr Wonderful from the market.

And yet, despite all of the above, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that imitation had indeed taken place.

The crucial point, however, is that it was lawful imitation.

One tweet quoted by the Court no fewer than four times illustrates this perfectly:

“Now I’m off to Ale-Hop, which is the poor man’s Mr Wonderful.”

This observation, together with the legal reasoning outlined above, helps explain why the appeal ultimately failed. Consumers compare products sold by both brands precisely because they clearly recognise them as belonging to different companies, each competing on the basis of its own commercial strengths.

This judgment is particularly valuable both because of the relative rarity of disputes of this nature and because of the clarity of its legal reasoning. It provides useful guidance on the circumstances in which imitation may amount to unfair competition and, perhaps more importantly, on when it does not.

Above all, it confirms a key principle: imitation, in itself, is not unlawful.

The fact that a product enjoys competitive distinctiveness does not automatically mean that imitation is unfair. The judgment therefore reinforces the principle that imitation carried out in good faith, while taking appropriate steps to distinguish one’s products from those of competitors, remains lawful.

In a sense, the decision echoes a broader cultural perspective often associated with innovation itself: imitation is not necessarily plagiarism. When undertaken in good faith and combined with a distinctive contribution of one’s own, it can also be a means of learning, recognising those who came before, and driving creative evolution.