The General Court of the European Union has confirmed, in its judgment of 2 September 2026 (Case T-675/25, Royal v EUIPO), the refusal to register the figurative mark ROYAL for fruit, vegetables and related services. The Court held that English-speaking consumers would perceive the sign as a mere laudatory expression rather than as an indication of commercial origin, and that the applicant had failed to establish that the mark had acquired distinctive character through use throughout the relevant territory.
The judgment is particularly noteworthy for two reasons. First, it clarifies the extent to which “abstract” praise may constitute an obstacle to registration. Secondly, it reinforces the stringent territorial evidential requirements imposed by Article 7(3) of the European Union Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) when acquired distinctiveness is invoked.
On 20 February 2024, the Seville-based company Royal filed an application with EUIPO to register the sign ROYAL, depicted in a stylised gold typeface with an enlarged initial “R”:
The application covered, inter alia, frozen fruit in Class 29; fruit, vegetables and other agricultural products in Class 31; and advertising, import, export and retail services relating to those goods in Class 35. The examiner refused the application in its entirety on the ground of lack of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR, a finding subsequently upheld by the Fourth Board of Appeal.
Promotional slogans and quality indications are not excluded from registration, nor are they subject to stricter criteria than other categories of signs (Audi v OHIM, C-398/08 P). Such signs may be registrable where, in addition to conveying an advertising message, they are perceived by the relevant public as indicating commercial origin. This may occur, for example, where the sign displays a degree of originality or resonance, requires a minimum level of interpretation, or prompts a cognitive process on the part of consumers.
The relevant public in the present case consisted of English-speaking consumers within the European Union, particularly those in Ireland and Malta, for whom the word “royal” may convey the idea of something excellent, impressive, or superior to ordinary quality. Royal argued that this meaning appeared only as the fourth or fifth definition in the Collins Dictionary and that the term did not describe any specific characteristic of the goods concerned. The Court rejected this argument, holding that a sign may be laudatory not only because it extols specific qualities but also because it conveys abstract qualities. In the Court’s view, quality is an essential characteristic of all goods and services. Consumers would therefore understand the sign as an invitation to purchase products of supposedly superior quality, “fit for a king”, rather than as a badge of trade origin.
Nor did the graphic representation overcome this objection. The typography was considered commonplace; neither the enlarged initial “R” nor its elongated strokes directed consumers towards a perception of commercial origin; and the gold colouring merely reinforced the ideas of royalty and superior quality conveyed by the word itself.
Royal also relied on its family of ROYAL marks and on previous EUIPO decisions recognising a minimum degree of distinctiveness in earlier registrations. The General Court dismissed these arguments. The concept of a family of marks is relevant to relative grounds for refusal, not to absolute grounds. Likewise, the minimum distinctiveness recognised in an existing registration cannot automatically be transposed to a subsequent application. Finally, the Boards of Appeal are not bound either by decisions of individual examiners or by previous administrative practice, since the legality of each decision must be assessed solely in light of the Regulation.
In our view, this aspect of the judgment provides the most valuable practical lesson. According to settled case law, acquired distinctiveness must be demonstrated throughout all parts of the European Union where the mark initially lacks inherent distinctiveness. While separate evidence is not necessarily required for every Member State, the body of evidence as a whole must cover the entire relevant territory, without leaving any Member State unaccounted for.
The Board of Appeal assessed the evidence specifically in relation to Ireland and Malta, which represented the most favourable scenario for Royal, since including other English-speaking Member States would only have enlarged the territory to be covered. It concluded that there was no direct evidence demonstrating recognition of the sign among consumers in either country, that the indirect evidence relating to Ireland was insufficient, and that no evidence whatsoever had been submitted in respect of Malta.
Before the General Court, Royal produced additional annexes relating to Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, two of which had been submitted for the first time during the judicial proceedings. However, the applicant did not contend, and expressly confirmed at the hearing that it did not contend, that such evidence could be extrapolated to Malta. The Court therefore held that, even if acquired distinctiveness had been established in those countries, this could not compensate for the absence of evidence in Malta and Ireland.
It is important to define the precise scope of the ruling. The General Court did not assess the substantive value of the evidence of use, nor did it rule on the admissibility of evidence submitted for the first time before it. It was sufficient for the Court to conclude that the evidence failed to cover the entirety of the relevant territory. Nevertheless, the judgment reiterates that sales figures and advertising materials constitute secondary forms of evidence which may corroborate, but cannot replace, direct evidence such as consumer surveys, market studies, or statements from professional associations. Finally, the Court confirmed that it lacks jurisdiction to order the registration of a sign, as EUIPO does not adopt a formal decision granting registration that is capable of being challenged before the Courts of the European Union.
How Far Does “Abstract” Laudatory Meaning Extend?
The Court’s assessment of “abstract” laudatory content bears certain similarities to the reasoning adopted by EUIPO in refusing Rosalía’s application for the mark LUX, a decision we analysed previously. In both cases, the signs were rejected because they conveyed an abstract notion of quality or luxury without describing a concrete characteristic of the goods or services concerned. This once again raises, in our opinion, the delicate boundary between lack of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR and descriptiveness under Article 7(1)(c) EUTMR.
If the mere evocation of quality is sufficient for a term to be regarded as a promotional message, and if quality is considered an essential characteristic of all goods and services, the scope for refusal becomes considerably broader. Almost any word with positive connotations could, in principle, become vulnerable to objections on distinctiveness grounds.
Accordingly, whilst acknowledging that average consumers do not generally infer commercial origin from promotional expressions, it remains open to debate whether that perception should necessarily be identical across all the goods and services claimed. It is not self-evident that the word “royal” conveys the same message in relation to fresh fruit as it does in relation to advertising services or import and export activities, yet the judgment does not differentiate between these categories.
From a practical perspective, the decision serves as a reminder that previous registrations do not guarantee the success of future applications and that the addition of conventional figurative elements, particularly where those elements reinforce the laudatory meaning of the word component, may be insufficient to overcome an objection based on lack of distinctive character.
Finally, the judgment highlights the importance of planning an evidential strategy well in advance when acquired distinctiveness through use is likely to be relied upon. Demonstrating a substantial commercial presence is not enough; applicants must establish that the relevant public actually recognises the sign as a trade mark throughout the entire relevant territory. As the ROYAL case illustrates, the absence of evidence relating to a single Member State may ultimately jeopardise the viability of the application as a whole.
